In response to the alarm, militiamen from Concord and Lincoln had gathered in Concord. They received reports of the Lexington fire and did not know whether they should wait to be reinforced by troops from nearby towns, or whether they should stay and defend the city or move east and salute the British army from the heights. A column of militia marched on the road to Lexington to meet the British, traveling about 2 km (1.5 miles) until they encountered the approaching column of regulars. As the regular soldiers numbered about 700 men and the militia numbered only about 250 at that time, the militia column turned back and returned to Concord, ahead of the regular soldiers by a distance of about 500 yards (457 m). [65] The militia withdrew to a ridge above the town, and its officers discussed what to do next. Caution prevailed, and Colonel James Barrett withdrew from the centre of the town and led the men across the north bridge to a hill about a mile to the north, where they could continue to observe the movement of British troops and activity in the town centre. This decision proved to be a fluke, as the militia`s ranks continued to grow as Minuteman companies from western cities joined. Although often referred to as a battle, the Battle of Lexington was actually a small sketch or skirmish. [42] When the advance guard of regular troops under Pitcairn arrived on September 19. When they entered Lexington at sunrise in April 1775, about 80 Lexington militiamen came out of the Buckman Tavern and stood in rows in the village square to watch them, and between 40 and 100 spectators watched them on the side of the road. [1] [43] Their leader was Captain John Parker, a veteran of the French and Indian War, who had contracted tuberculosis and was sometimes difficult to hear.
Of the militiamen who formed, nine were nicknamed Harrington, seven Munroes (including company sergeant William Munroe), four Parkers, three Tidds, three Lockes, and three Reeds. A quarter of them were related to Captain Parker in one way or another. [44] This militia group was part of the Lexington «training band,» a means of organizing local militias dating back to the Puritans, rather than the so-called Minuteman Company. [45] Throughout the case, the rebels attacked us in a very dispersed and irregular manner, but with perseverance and determination, and they did not dare to form a regular corps. In fact, they knew all too well what was right to do that. Anyone who considers them an irregular crowd will be sorely mistaken. They have among them men who know very well what it is, having been used as rangers against the Indians and Canadians, and this land, which is much covered with woods and hilly, is very beneficial to their method of fighting. [103] Some of those who testified in 1775 later changed their minds about what happened, and prejudice on both sides makes it difficult to draw conclusions. Despite these public relations campaigns to set the record straight, we still don`t know the truth. I. ordered our militia to meet in the commune in said Lexington to discuss what to do, and concluded not to be detected, not to interfere, or to engage with the said regular troops (if they approached) unless they insulted or harassed us; And when they suddenly approached, I immediately ordered our militia to disperse and not to fire: — At once the said troops appeared and rushed furiously, shot and killed eight members of our Party, without receiving any provocation from us. [51] Smith and Pitcairn ordered a return to Boston, which turned into a defeat when the British were attacked from all sides by angry swarms of Minute Men along the Today`s Battle Road.
When they reached Lexington, Parker`s men took revenge for the violence they had suffered that morning and shot at the British regulars under cover. For the next 12 miles, the British were constantly ambushed by Minute Men firing behind trees, rock walls and buildings. British reinforcements reached Smith and Pitcairn`s men in the eastern suburbs of Lexington, but the Minute Men pursued them as they withdrew to Boston. Parker had every reason to expect this to happen again. The regulars marched on Concord, found nothing, and returned to Boston tired but empty-handed. He has positioned his business carefully. He placed them in parade field formation on Lexington Common. They were in sight (not hiding behind walls) but were not blocking the road to Concord. They showed political and military determination, but no effort to prevent the advance of the regulars. [49] Many years later, one of the participants remembered Parker`s words as what is now set in stone at the site of the battle: «Hold on; Don`t shoot if you don`t get fired, but if they want to make war, let it start here.
[50] According to Parker`s affidavit after the battle: Percy took the overland route via Boston Neck and the Great Bridge, which some quick-witted settlers had stolen their planks to stop the British. His men then met a distracted tutor at Harvard College and asked him which road would take them to Lexington.[106] The Harvard man, seemingly oblivious to the reality of what was happening around him, showed him the right way without thinking. (Later, he was forced to leave the country because he accidentally supported the enemy.) [107] Percy`s troops arrived in Lexington around 2:00 p.m. They could hear gunshots in the distance as they set up their cannons and established regular lines on a hill with a magnificent view of the city. Colonel Smith`s men approached like a fleeing mob with the complete occupation of colonial militias in close formation, which pursued them. Percy ordered his artillery to open fire at an extreme distance and disperse the colonial militiamen. Smith`s men collapsed from exhaustion as they reached the safety of Percy`s lines. [108] Revere, Dawes and Prescott`s route triggered a flexible «alarm and muster» system that had been carefully crafted months earlier in response to the settlers` helpless response to the powder alarm. This system was an improved version of an old notification network to be used in case of emergency.
Settlers had used it regularly in the early years of the Indian Wars in the colony, before it fell into oblivion during the French and Indian Wars. In addition to other express drivers delivering messages, bells, drums, alarm rifles, bonfires and a trumpet were used for quick city-to-city communication to inform rebels in dozens of villages in eastern Massachusetts to gather their militias because more than 500 regular soldiers were leaving Boston. This system was so effective that residents of towns 25 miles (40 km) from Boston noticed the army`s movements while unloading boats in Cambridge. [33] These early warnings played a crucial role in assembling enough colonial militias to inflict heavy damage on British regiments later that day. Adams and Hancock were eventually taken to safety, first to Burlington and then to Billerica. [34] The British then went to Concord to look for weapons, noting that the vast majority had already been resettled. They decided to burn the little they found, and the fire easily got out of control. Hundreds of militiamen occupying the hill outside Concord mistakenly thought the entire city would be burned. The militiamen pushed to the north bridge of Concord, defended by a contingent of British soldiers.
The British fired first, but retreated when the colonists turned the salvo around. Lieutenant-Colonel Smith, concerned for the safety of his men, sent flank troops along a ridge and protected his forces from the approximately 1,000 colonialists now on the ground as the British marched east from Concord. This ridge ended near Meriam`s Corner, a crossroads about 2 km from the village of Concord, where the main road led to a bridge over a small stream. To cross the narrow bridge, the British had to bring the flankers back into the main column, reducing the ranks to only three soldiers. Colonial militia companies from the north and east had already converged by this time and represented a clear numerical advantage over regular soldiers. [89] The British witnessed once again what General Gage had hoped to avoid by sending the expedition secretly and into the darkness of the night: the ability of colonial militiamen to rise by the thousands and assemble when British forces ventured out of Boston.