«In the final provisions of statutes and other writings, `include` is often, if not usually, used as an extension or extension word [meaning `in addition to`] rather than as a word of limitation or enumeration. Fraser v. Bentel, 161 Cal. 390, 394, 119 p. 509, Ann. Cas. 1913B, 1062; Menschen ex rel. Estate of Woolworth v. S.T. Comm., 200 App.Div. 287, 289, 192 N.Y.P. 772; Goetz case, 71 App.Div. 272, 275, 75 N.Y.P.
750; Calhoun v. Memphis & P.R. Co., Fed. Case No. 2,309; Cooper v. Stinson, 5 Minn. 522 (Gil. 416). Subject to the effect to be given depending on the context, Section 1 (11 USCA 1) prescribes the interpretations to be applied to the various words and phrases used in the Act. Some of the final clauses begin with «includes», others with «means».
The first is used in eighteen cases and the second in nine cases, and in two cases. Looking at the section as a whole, it is obvious that these verbs are not used interchangeably or vaguely, but with distinction and with the aim of giving each a meaning that cannot be attributed to the other. It is clear that, at least in some cases, the word «must include» is used without implying that the exclusion is intended. Subsections (6) and (7), which each use both verbs, illustrate the use of «means» to enumerate and restrict, and «shall include» to enlarge and expand. Subsection (17) states that the term «oath» includes an endorsement, while subsection (19) states that the term «persons» must include corporations, officers, partnerships and women. Men are not mentioned. In these cases, the verb is used to extend, not to restrict. It is clear that the word «include» as used in subsection (9), when taken in conjunction with other parts of the section, cannot reasonably be interpreted as equivalent to «means» or «includes only». [287 U.S.
513, 518] Since there is no other purpose, it must be assumed that Congress intended the term «creditor» in Article 3a(1) to be given the meaning normally ascribed to it when used in the definition of fraudulent transfers. See Coder v. Arts, 213 U.S. 223, 242, 29 S.Ct. 436, 16 Ann.Cas. 1008; Lansing Boiler & Engine Works v. Joseph T. Ryerson & Son (C.C.A.) 128 F. 701, 703; Githens v. Shiffler (D.C.) 112 F.
505. Under the common law rule, a creditor who has only one contingent claim, such as the one the plaintiff had at the time of the transfer of the defendant in question, is protected against fraudulent transfer. And the applicant was entitled, as a creditor under the agreement, to rely on that rule from the moment he became the guarantor of Mogliani`s surety. Yeend v. Wochen, 104 Ala. 331, 341, 16 So. 165, 53 Am.St.Rep. 50; Whitehouse v.
Bolster, 95 Me. 458, 50 S. 240; Mowry v. Reed, 187 Mass. 174, 177, 72 N.E. 936; Stein v. Myers, 9 Minn. 303 (Gil.
287, 294), 86 Am.Dec. 104; Koch v. Johnson, 12 N.J.Eq. 51, 72 Am.Dec. 381; American Surety Co. v. Hattrem, 138 Gold. 358, 364, 3 P.(2d) 1109, 6 P.(2d) 1087; U.S.
Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Centropolis Bank (C.C.A.) 17 F.(2d) 913, 916, 53 A.L.R. 295; Thomson v. Crane (C.C.) 73 E. 327, 331.» You need to be aware of how these two terms work, otherwise you`ll never really understand what a law or statute that uses them really means, let alone how it is legally and legally permissible to be interpreted and enforced, meaning you`ll almost certainly lose your case and then maybe your money. your home or your freedom. Such a definition would run counter to the «ambiguous and overly broad» rule.
A definition worded as you propose would attempt to define the term «fruit» in two different ways in the same definition, as «fruit» and as «food,» which it cannot do. «Ejusdem generis. Of the same nature, class or nature. In the interpretation of laws, wills and other instruments, the «ejusdem generis rule» is that if general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a definite and specific meaning, these general words are not to be interpreted in their broadest scope, but apply only to persons or things of the same general type or class as those expressly mentioned. U.S. v. LaBrecque, D.C. N.J., 419 F.Supp. 430, 432. However, the rule does not necessarily require that the general rule be limited in scope to the specific identical things mentioned. Nor does it apply if the context indicates a contrary intent.
I would need a link to the ENTIRE law you are referring to, because it is virtually impossible to properly understand the totality of what a law says, does, or influences without being able to see it in its entirety. In this context, we apply the principle that a list of terms must be interpreted as implicitly encompassing additional terms of the same type and class as those expressly included. Certainly, the widow chose to be part of the group. In common parlance, isn`t anyone who receives assets from the estate free of charge a beneficiary? If there is no will, the widow is heiress and receives a portion of the estate determined by the legislature. If there is a will, she can be a legatee, or she can waive her rights and receive another share. But in any case, at first glance, the purpose of the research §§ 661-662 applies exactly. «Yes. A word has an infinite number of meanings, obviously reasoning would be impossible; Because not having meaning means having no meaning, and when words have no meaning, we think together.